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This thesis examines optimal public policy in an R&D-based endogenous 
growth model with elastic labor supply and monopolistic supply of 
intermediate goods. The focus of this study is on R&D subsidies financed by 
various distortionary taxes. The balanced growth paths of both decentralized 
economy and social planner’s economy are computed, and the welfare effects 
of financing R&D subsidies with consumption taxes, labor income taxes, and 
capital income taxes are explored. It is shown that consumption taxes are the 
most efficient taxes to finance R&D subsidies, while capital income taxes are 
the least efficient taxes. This result is consistent with those in the existing 
literature on taxation in neoclassical growth models and capital-based 
endogenous growth models. This finding complements the studies in the 
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This thesis presents the analysis of optimal public policy in an endogenous 
growth model with elastic labor supply and monopolistic supply of 
intermediate goods. We use an R&D-based endogenous growth model in this 
thesis for two reasons. First, we believe that technological progress is the most 
important source of economic growth and that R&D is the most important 
determinant of technological progress. Second, there is limited research on 
optimal public policy in R&D-based growth models.  
The growth and welfare effects of public policy in endogenous growth 
models have been a hot topic of study for decades. The existing studies 
however mainly focus on capital-based models, where technological change is 
unintentional. Most of these studies conclude that consumption taxes, labor 
income taxes, and capital income taxes all discourage human and physical 
capital accumulation and thus have a negative effect on long run growth and 
welfare [e.g., Chamley (1981), Lucas (1990), and Devereux and Love (1994)]. 
In these literatures, these taxes are ranked according to their welfare costs. A 
general conclusion is that capital income taxes have the highest welfare cost, 
followed by labor income taxes and consumption taxes. 
Different from the capital-based growth models mentioned above, the 
R&D-based models incorporate monopoly rents as a reward of technological 
progress [e.g., Romer (1986), Aghion and Howitt (1992)]. There are several 
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distinctive characteristics associated with monopoly power which have 
important implications for optimal public policy.  
Firstly, according to Romer (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), 
monopoly brings with it static efficiency loss and an insufficient private rate of 
return to the economy. The static efficiency loss means that the monopolistic 
producers of intermediate goods will choose a higher price and a lower level 
of output to maximize its profit, leading to a decrease in finally goods sector’s 
demand for intermediate goods and thus a decrease in the output of the final 
goods sector. Secondly, the knowledge spillover effect results in a gap 
between the social and private rates of return because part of the private R&D 
benefits is not compensated, and thus reduce the incentive of R&D activities 
in the decentralized economy. Both of these result in a lower (than optimal) 
rate of long run growth.  
Because of the existence of monopoly power, the first best outcome may 
never be achieved even with public policy instruments. As a result, we should 
in turn focus our attention upon the second best public policy.  
In this thesis, we would like to explore whether the growth and welfare 
effects of taxation in such a model are qualitatively similar to those in the 
capital-based models. Zeng and Zhang (2002) show that in an extended 
version of Howitt (1999)’s model, capital income tax always decreases the 
long run growth rate. Peretto (2007) shows that eliminating the corporate 
income tax and the capital gains tax raise welfare in a similar R&D-based 
growth model. He also finds that the growth effect of taxes on dividends, 
which is an endogenous tax necessary to balance the budget, is positive. 
However, there are surprisingly few published works on the welfare rankings 
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of consumption taxes, labor income taxes and capital income taxes within such 
models, let alone the optimal public policy analysis. The aim of this thesis is 
therefore to fill this gap. We use both analytical and numerical approaches to 
find the optimal (second-best) public policy and the welfare rankings of these 
taxes.  
We will first consider the model economy’s decentralized equilibrium and 
social optimal solution, and then compare the welfare effects of different taxes 
and choose the most efficient combination of taxes to finance R&D subsidies.  
Due to the mathematical complexity of this model, the closed-form 
solution cannot be obtained. We provide several numerical simulations. The 
numerical results suggest that (a) the long run growth rate of the decentralized 
economy is lower than the social planner’s economy; (b) the equilibrium 
growth effects of R&D subsidies financed by all these taxes are positive in the 
benchmark economy; (c) the welfare cost of consumption taxes is the lowest, 
followed by labor income taxes, and capital income taxes.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant 
literatures. Chapter 3 describes the economic environment and sets up the 
framework. Chapter 4 and 5 give the results of the decentralized economy and 
the social planner’s economy respectively. Chapter 6 compares the 
decentralized equilibrium and the social optimal equilibrium. Chapter 7 
compares the welfare effects of taxes and describes the optimal public policy 
by numerical results. Finally, Chapter 8 gives the conclusion. We find out that 
the existence of monopoly power in the intermediate goods sector leads to 
lower levels of output in both the intermediate goods and final goods sector 
and the lower private rate of return on R&D investments results in a lower rate 
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of long-run growth. Public policies, especially consumption taxes, increase 
welfare when they are used to stimulate R&D activities. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Development of growth theory  
There are three phases in the development of growth theory. The first starts 
with Domar (1947) and Harrod (1948). Because the aggregate output and 
investment are proportional to the stock of physical capital in their models, the 
growth rates of both capital and output are fixed accordingly. But these 
assumptions lead to two unrealistic consequences. One is that the 
unemployment rate and capacity utilization rate will keep rising or falling for a 
prolonged period, whilst the other is that the industrial growth rate of a 
developing country can be simply controlled by manipulating its investment 
quota.  
In the second phase, the above problems have been solved in neoclassical 
models by endogenizing the output-capital ratio [e.g., Solow (1956) and Swan 
(1956)]. Under the assumption of diminishing returns, the tradeoff between 
labor and capital provides the possibility of adjusting the output-capital ratio, 
which indicates the existence of a balanced long run growth rate. In that 
steady-state, the capital stock and level of output per capita converge to their 
upper limits, and the only way to explain the long run growth is through 
technological change. But the assumption of exogenous technological change 
in neoclassical models leaves the determinants of economic growth 
unexplained.   
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Arrow (1962) attempts to endogenize technological change through the 
“Learning by Doing” phenomenon, presupposing that the development of 
technology is unintentionally associated with the physical capital 
accumulation process. Kaldor (1957) introduces his “Technical Progress 
Function” which suggests that the implementation of new ideas is tied to new 
capital goods. Lucas (1988) focuses on human capital instead of physical 
capital. In all of these capital-based endogenous models, the long run growth 
of output is independent of investment activities and is determined by 
exogenous properties.  
Romer (1990) sheds a new light on the endogenous growth theory with 
the framework of intentional technological change that can sustain the long 
run economic growth. The assumptions he makes are that (a) technological 
change mainly results from intentional actions motivated by monopoly rent; (b) 
technologies are non-rival yet excludable goods. There are tremendous works 
influenced by Romer (1990) [e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion 
and Howitt (1992), Stokey (1991), and Young (1991, 1993)]. 
An interesting modified version of Romer (1990) is given by Aghion and 
Howitt (1992), where Schumpeter’s notion of “Creative Destruction” has been 
incorporated into the endogenous growth model. It indicates that new 
innovations will cause previous innovations to become obsolete in a drastic 
way. “Creative Destruction” does happen in the real world sometimes, but 
innovations can also be complementary with their predecessors. It is not clear 
which assumption is better. In this thesis we adopt the latter one, leaving an 
opportunity for further exploring our topic using the Schumpeterian model. 
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One problem associated with the endogenous growth theory is the scale 
effect. In the models with scale effect [e.g., Romer (1990), Grossman and 
Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992)], countries with larger 
populations should always grow faster, which is at odds with 20th-century 
empirical evidence provided by Jones (1995a). Jones (1995b), Kortum (1997), 
and Segerstrom (1998) attempt to eliminate the scale effect on long run growth 
by reducing the impact of knowledge spillover, but it still exists in the sense 
that a larger size of population often leads to a higher level of per capita 
income. Alternative models [e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1998), Dinopoulos and 
Thompson (1998), and Peretto (1998) and Young (1998)] propose that R&D 
can either increase productivity within a product line or increase the variety of 
available products. In these models, the scale of population affects the variety 
of available products, leaving the amount of effort per product line constant. 
Because it is the amount of R&D effort devoted to a specific product line that 
determines the growth rate, the scale effect on growth is eliminated. But these 
models require a combination of restrictive assumptions.  
More details of the discussion about scale effect are given by Jones (1995). 
There is no final conclusion to say which model provides the best description 
of the real economy. And because the focus of this thesis is based on the 
introduction of monopoly, we abstract from the scale effect by normalizing the 
population to one as in Zeng and Zhang (2007). 
2.2 Labor-leisure allocation 
Early literatures analyzing the effects of taxation in endogenous growth 
models take labor supply as given, ignoring the distortionary effect of taxation 
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on labor-leisure allocation. Rebelo (1991) explores the growth and welfare 
effects of various public policies on a modified version of Romer’s (1986) 
model, where technology is set as constant return to scale. His work concludes 
that investment tax decreases the growth rate, while consumption tax does not 
affect the growth rate but the level of the consumption path. Since a 
proportional tax on (gross) income amounts to taxing consumption and 
investment at the same rate, an increase in the income tax rate causes a 
decrease in the growth rate. Also, since the labor supply elasticity is omitted, 
consumption tax operates as a non-distortionary lump sum tax. 
Endogenizing labor supply leads to fundamental changes in the 
equilibrium structure of the endogenous growth model. Devereux and Love 
(1994) extends the model of King and Rebelo (1990) by allowing for an 
endogenous labor supply. Turnovsky (2000) describes the balanced growth 
equilibrium in terms of growth-leisure tradeoff loci and analyzes the 
implications of an endogenous labor supply for fiscal policy. In contrast to the 
case of inelastic labor supply, these studies show that all taxes reduce the labor 
supply and growth rate.  
Literatures with labor-leisure allocation have so far focused on capital-
based models. In this thesis we endogenize labor supply in an R&D-based 
model to investigate public policy in the form of distortionary taxes and R&D 
subsidies. 
2.3 Framework of innovation 
One concern about the framework of innovation is how to model innovation. 
The models of Romer (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) describe 
8 
 
innovations in terms of product variety expansion, where more R&D input 
leads to more innovations and one innovation can be used to produce one 
intermediate goods. Other models, such as Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos 
(1990) and Howitt and Aghion (1992), describe innovations in terms of 
product quality improvement, where R&D input leads to higher quality 
intermediate goods. Young (1998) incorporates both horizontal and vertical 
innovations in his model, where the technology growth rate is proportional to 
the aggregate rate of vertical innovations. The model of Young (1998) better 
describes the real-world economy, which is a composite of innovation both in 
variety expansion and quality improvement. Because the choice of horizontal 
and vertical innovation does not have a substantial effect on our study, we will 
only focus on vertical innovation for simplicity. 
The other concern is the distribution of innovation. Romer (1990) assumes 
Deterministic Distribution, where effort can certainly lead to innovation and 
the amount of innovation is proportional to the human capital devoted to R&D. 
Jones (1995) suggests that it could be given microfoundations by appealing to 
a Poisson process governing the arrival rate. Howitt and Aghion (1992) adopt 
the Poisson Distribution. Similar to the intuition of Poisson Distribution, 
Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2004) takes the innovation as Binomial 
Distribution. Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos (1990) models R&D 
competition as "Invention Lottery", in which the probability of winning is 
proportional to the resources devoted to R&D by each firm. The economic 
intuition of Deterministic Distribution is that output is a deterministic function 
of input in the R&D sector, while the other distributions further incorporate 
the uncertainty of success. We use the Deterministic Distribution because this 
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simple assumption simplifies the analysis without losing qualitative insights 
on the growth and welfare effect of public policy. 
2.4 Optimal public policy 
An important public policy problem is the optimal taxation problem, which is 
solved by minimizing the aggregate deadweight loss, or maximizing the 
welfare, subject to the government budget constraint for any given tax revenue. 
Tax systems are ranked according to the criterion of their economic efficiency.  
Along with the development of growth theory, the growth effects of taxation 
are also intensively studied. 
A pioneering paper by Ramsey (1927) describes how to adjust the tax 
rates on commodities to minimize the decrement of the utility. In the two 
decades following this paper, much work has been done in the neoclassical 
models. Judd (1987) examines the marginal efficiency cost of various taxes, 
indicating that decreasing investment taxes and increasing labor income taxes 
lead to a more desirable tax system. Chamley (1986) analyzes the optimal 
taxation of capital income concludes that the second best steady-state capital 
tax rate converges to zero.  
In recent years, numerous studies extend the analysis of taxes to the 
endogenous growth models [e.g., Barro (1990), Jones and Manuelli (1990), 
King and Rebelo (1990), Lucas (1990), Rebelo (1991), Pecorino (1993), 
Devereux and Love (1994), and Cassou and Lansing (1997)]. They all focus 
on capital-based models but differ greatly in the types of fiscal instruments 
involved. Stokey and Rebelo (1995) summarize that the existing estimates of 
the potential growth effects of tax reform vary from zero to eight percentage 
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points. Different from those studies that focus on capital-based endogenous 
growth models, we explore the growth and welfare effects of taxation in an 
R&D-based model. 
Many R&D models indicate inefficient levels of R&D investment, 
suggesting that R&D should be subsidized to encourage innovation. This 
finding is consistent with the observation of public policy in the real world. 
Adam and Farber (1987, 1988) report that the government spending make up 
of about 50%, 50%, 33%, and 20% of total R&D in U.S., France, Germany 
and Japan respectively. Katz and Ordover (1990) report a 47% subsidy to 
R&D in the private sector in the U.S.  In this thesis, we consider R&D 
subsidies financed by distortionary taxes including consumption tax, labor 
income tax and capital income tax. 
3 The Basic Model 
We follow Romer (1990) to assume technologies are non-rival yet excludable 
goods. Non-rival means that the whole market has free access to the 
knowledge of previous technology, which is consistent with the public-good 
character of knowledge defined by Solow (1956) and Shell (1966), while 
excludable means that only firms with patent can use the technology in the 
production process. According to Romer (1990), the intuition is that the owner 
of an innovation has property right over its use in the production of new goods 
but not over its use in the research of updating technology. 
The non-rivalry results in a positive externality because the whole society 
can benefit from the privately produced technology for free. This in turn 
increases the productivity of the R&D sector. But the exclusivity results in a 
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negative externality because the monopoly power will increase the price of the 
intermediate goods and thus decrease the demand for intermediate goods of 
the final goods sector.   
3.1 Production 
There are three production sectors in this economy: the final goods sector, the 
intermediate goods sector and the R&D sector. The final goods sector and the 
R&D sector are assumed to be perfectly competitive, while the intermediate 
goods sector holds permanent monopoly power on the patent for the 
technology it owns, which is produced by the R&D sector.  
In this circumstance even though all of the producers have the same 
opportunity to buy the innovation from the R&D sector, they can make no 
profit on the innovation without purchasing the patent for the existing 
technology. Thus the monopolistic producer in the intermediate goods sector 
will be the same in each period.     
3.1.1 Final goods production 
The single final output is produced by labor and intermediate goods according 
to the production function 
                                                                        (1) 
where  is final output;  is the technology variable, which measures the 
quality of intermediate goods and therefore has an effect on the productivity of 
the labor force;  is the amount of intermediate goods;  is the amount of 
labor input; the parameter α and (1-α) measures the contribution of 
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intermediate goods and labor input to the final goods production respectively; 
and t represents time, where one period represents about 30 years.  
Assume that the final product can be used interchangeably as 
consumption and physical capital. The profit of the final goods sector is: 
  
where  is the wage rate for labor input;  is the price of . Since  is 
consistent over time, we ignore the subscript t for convenience. Solving the 
problem yields the following first order conditions: 
:                                                       (2) 
:                                                                   (3) 
3.1.2 Intermediate goods production 
The only input used in the intermediate goods production process is the 
physical capital . The production function of intermediate goods is given by: 
                                                                                                        (4) 
This function captures the “fishing out” effect mentioned by Aghion, 
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2004). That is, as the technology frontier 
advancing and becoming more complex, a country needs to keep increasing its 
input in order to keep pace with the frontier. The observation that that 
production with more advanced technology always tends to be more capital 
intensive supports this assumption. 
Like Judd (1985), we assume that a patent can be held permanently. Thus 
once the intermediate goods producer purchases the technology  , it can 
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permanently use . After the R&D sector makes new innovation which can 
be purchased in period , the monopolistic producer can buy the 
innovation to increase its monopoly profit. The producer will choose the price 
of its output to maximize its profit: 
                   
where  is the interest rate and  is the depreciation rate for physical capital. 
Here we assume complete depreciation, that is . Combining this with the 
final goods producer’s demand for intermediate goods given by (3), we get: 
                  
Solving this problem yields: 
                                                                                            (5) 
Substituting (5) into (3) and (1), we can get: 
                                                                                       (6) 
                                                              (7) 
So the monopoly profit of the intermediate goods sector with technology 
 is: 
  




Technology updates, which result in quality improvement of intermediate 
goods, come from innovations with private labor input. The basic framework 
is due to Romer (1990), while we consider the input as labor  instead of 
human capital.  
With labor input  and technology  in the period t, the technology can 
be updated to  in period t+1. The improvement of the technology is then 
given by: 
                                                                   (9) 
where  is the productivity parameter of R&D production. Equation (9) also 
measures the quality improvement of intermediate goods. Since the 
intermediate goods sector can hold the patent permanently once purchased, 
which then means that the existing monopolist who owns the patent of , 
once purchased the patent of innovation, can then extract a permanent 
monopoly profit corresponding to  forever from period t+1. However, 
without any technology update in the R&D sector, then the technology is , 
meaning they can only extract a permanent monopoly profit corresponding to 
 for the same duration of time. Thus the net revenue of the innovation 
resulting in a technology update from to , should be the difference of 
the discounted stream of the monopolist’s profits between holding technology 
and . The cost is the wage paid to . 
By using to denote the discounted stream of the monopolist’s 
profits with technology from period t+1, and then using  to 
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denote the discounted stream of the monopolist’s profits with technology  
from period t+1, we can get the following formulae: 
  
  
In the steady-state, the interest rate should be constant, so 
that . Substituting equation (8) into the expression of  
and , we can get: 
  
                    =  
                     
  
                 
                 
The above expressions show that the difference between  
and only results from the difference between and . Assume 
that is the subsidy to R&D activity to explore the optimal policy. The profit 
of the technology update in the R&D sector in period t is :  
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Because the market for R&D is assumed to be perfectly competitive in 
our model, the net revenue of any technology update should equal the cost of 
labor input, which yields a zero profit. And by combining the relationship of 
 and  expressed by (9), we can get: 
  
from which we can get another expression for  : 
                                            (10) 
Since the wage rate for  and  should be equal, we can get the 
following relationship through (2), (6), and (10): 
                                                                                              (11) 
3.2 Government 
Like most of the previous studies focusing on the effects of taxation, we 
assume the tax revenue comes from consumption tax , labor income tax , 
and capital income tax . The government’s objective is to find the optimal 
subsidy and taxation to maximize social welfare. 
We assume that there is no government consumption on goods, and the 
government balances its budget in every period. The proceeds of taxes are 
used to finance the R&D subsidy. 
                                                       (12) 
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3.3 Market clearing condition 
Final output is allocated between consumption and physical capital 
accumulation:  
  
where is consumption. Since we have assumed , the market clearing 
condition can be simplified to:  
                                                                                         (13) 
3.4 Household 
Following Devereux and Love (1994), we assume the welfare of the 
representative household is given by: 




and represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  
For simplicity, we let  and use the log utility function, which is also 
used by Romer (1990): 
                                        (14) 
Hours spent away from leisure are partly devoted to final goods 
production and partly devoted to R&D production. 
                                                                                          (15) 
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We assume that the household directly saves in the term of capital, and 
rent out capital to the intermediate goods sector at the interest rate . The 
household chooses consumption, saving, and labor supply to maximize its 
utility. The budget constraint is: 
                           (16) 
The household’s problem can then be described as maximizing (14) with 
the constraint of (16). The corresponding Lagrangian function is: 
       Solving the problem yields the following first order conditions: 
:                                                                        (17) 
:                                                                (18) 
:                                                          (19) 
4 Decentralized equilibrium  
In the decentralized equilibrium, prices and quantities are consistent with the 
welfare maximization conditions for the household (17), (18) and (19); the 
profit maximization conditions for final goods sector (2) and (3), for the 
intermediate goods sector (6) and (8), and for the R&D sector (10) and (11); 
the government budget constraint (12); and the market clearing conditions for 
final goods (13) and for labor (15). The equilibrium solutions are: 
                                                                                   (20) 
                                                     (21) 
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                                                                                   (22) 
                                                                                   (23) 
                                                                                      (24) 
                           (25) 
                                                                    (26) 
                                                                 (27) 
In this thesis we analyze the optimal public policy of the economy in 
steady-state. That is, we assume that the economy has already reached the 
steady-state in period zero. In that case the welfare can be expressed by: 
  
         (28) 
Eq. (20) gives us the relationship of  and : they are positively related. 
Eq. (21) is derived from the market clearing condition of the final goods 
market: The left hand side represents one unit minus the fraction of final 
output consumed by the household, while the right hand side represents the 
fraction of the final output saved as capital for the production of the next 
period. Eq. (22) is derived from the profit maximization activities of different 
production sectors. Eq. (23), Eq. (24), Eq. (25), Eq. (26) and Eq. (27) are 
equilibrium output of final goods, intermediate goods, consumption, and 
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capital stock respectively. , ,  grow at a constant rate  in proportion to 
the labor input in the R&D sector. 
Combining Eq. (20), Eq. (21), Eq. (22), Eq. (27), we get the relationship 
between  and : 
                                                                                  (29) 
                                                 (30) 
Here Eq. (29) and Eq. (30) represent a tradeoff between the equilibrium 
growth rate and the fraction of time devoted to work. Eq. (29) comes from the 
labor market clearing condition, indicating that the labor inputs in the R&D 
sector and the final goods sector are positively correlated and a higher fraction 
of time devoted to work increases the equilibrium growth rate. Eq. (30) 
restates the market clearing condition for the final goods market. Intuitively, a 
higher growth rate comes along with a decrease in the fraction of final output 
consumed by individuals, and an increase of the fraction of the final output 
saved as capital for the next period.  
We consider only the steady-state equilibrium in this thesis, and the 
restriction that guarantees the unique steady-state equilibrium is given by:  
Proposition 1. The sufficient and necessary condition for the unique steady-
state growth equilibrium is: 
 (31) 
The shape and convexity of the curve (30) in the first quadrant is shown 
by Appendix 1. As are shown in Figure 1, curve (29) and (30) intersect the 






Figure 1  
The intersection of curve (29) and (30) gives the equilibrium growth rate 
and labor supply. Based on the shapes of the curves (29) and (30), it is easy to 
conclude that is the necessary condition for a positive balanced 
growth rate. Solving  yields (31). Thus condition (31) is the 
necessary condition for the existence of the unique balanced growth 
equilibrium. We have also proved the sufficiency of (31) in Appendix 2. In 














hold true if the productivity of R&D is sufficiently high, the household is 
sufficiently patient, and the household does not value leisure too much.  
It is easy to analyze the growth effect of taxation taking the taxes and 
subsidy variables as exogenous. According to Appendix 3, 
. That is, the growth effects of all taxes are 
unambiguously negative and the growth effect of subsidy is unambiguously 
positive. It means that consumption tax, labor income tax, and capital income 
tax all decrease the growth rate while the subsidy to R&D helps to increase the 
growth rate. This result consists with the existing literatures.  
5 Social planner’s solution  
In this chapter we derive the social planner’s solution. Let denotes the 
welfare of the household given by the social planner’s solution: 
                                   (32) 
The social planner maximizes the household’s utility under the constraints 
of final goods production, intermediate goods production, R&D production, 
the market clearing condition for final goods, and the market clearing 
condition for labor input: 
                                                                (33) 
                                                                                                   (34) 
                                                                           (35) 
                                                                                    (36) 
                                                                                         (37) 
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The corresponding Lagrangian function is: 
       Solving the problem yields the following first order conditions: 
:                                                                                   (38) 
:                                                      (39) 
:                                                                (40) 
:                              (41) 
:                                                                   (42) 
The social optimal equilibrium is given by: 
                                                            (43) 
                                                                      (44) 
                                                                                                   (45) 
                                           (46) 
                                                                        (47) 
                                                                                          (48) 
           (49) 
Similar to the assumption we made for the decentralized economy, we 
assume that the social planner’s economy has already reached the steady-state 
at period zero. Combining Eq. (46) and Eq. (48), we get . 
Here is the initial condition of this economy, and is the capital in 
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period zero which satisfies the assumption that the starting point of the 
economy is already at steady-state. According to Eq. (45), Eq. (46), Eq. (47), 
and Eq. (48), we have: 
  
   
  
  
 The welfare can be expressed by: 
   (50) 
 Similar to the decentralized equilibrium, we restate the market clearing 
conditions for the labor market and the final goods market as follows: 
                                                                                    (51) 
                                                                                 (52) 
where the intersection of line (51) and (52) determines the social optimal 
growth rate and labor supply.   








6 Comparison between the decentralized equilibrium and the social 
optimal solution 
In this chapter we compare the balanced growth rate in the decentralized 
economy and that in the social planner’s economy. The conclusion is 
consistent with the existing studies in both capital-based and R&D-based 
endogenous growth models. 
Proposition 2. The growth rate in the decentralized equilibrium (without the 
















Let , then we get  
. As is proved in Appendix 4, under the unique 
balanced growth path, we can get and the 
slope  for every point of the curves (29), 
(30), (51) and (52) in the first quadrant.  Thus according to Figure 3, we 
get . That is, the growth rate in the decentralized equilibrium is lower 
than that in the social optimal solution. The underlining explanations are: (a) 
the monopoly price of intermediate goods reduces the demand for it from the 




















economic growth; (b) the knowledge spillover effect results in insufficient 
incentive to engage R&D and therefore slow down the technological progress. 
7 Optimal public policy  
In this chapter we focus on the optimal public policy in the decentralized 
economy with monopoly. Firstly we consider the first best public policy. 
Because the first best public policy doesn’t exist, we then explore the second 
best public policy. 
7.1 First best public policy 
The first best public policy arises from equalizing the decentralized 
equilibrium and the social planner’s solution. With inelastic labor supply and 
lump-sum taxes in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), subsidies to purchases of 
intermediate goods and final product can achieve the social optimum, while 
subsidies to R&D cannot. That is because the R&D subsidy can only increases 
the incentive of R&D activities but cannot increases the demand for 
intermediate goods. In a model with elastic labor supply and distortionary 
taxes, Zeng and Zhang (2007) show that no combination of subsidies can 
achieve the first best result.  Also we can show the same result with our model. 
As mentioned before, if the first best public policy exists, the 
decentralized equilibrium should equal to the social planner’s solution, thus 
we insert the socially optimal solution ( ) in the decentralized equilibrium 
Eq. (29) and Eq. (30). Combine Eq. (51) with Eq. (29), we get . 
28 
 
Substitute , Eq. (43), and Eq. (44) into the decentralized equilibrium 
solution Eq. (20), we get , which violate the assumption that . 
Thus we claim that no combination of ( ) can achieve the first 
best result in our model. And in turn we focus on the second best public policy. 
7.2 Second best public policy 
As is discussed in the introduction chapter and chapter 6, the monopoly power 
of the intermediate goods sector results in insufficient demand for the 
intermediate goods and insufficient incentive for R&D activities, and therefore 
leads to a lower growth rate compared to the social optimum.  But the long run 
growth of the economy can be stimulated by subsidies, which are financed by 
taxation. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) compare various types of subsidies with 
lump-sum taxes and fixed labor supply. A subsidy to the purchase of 
intermediate goods will increase the demand for intermediate goods and 
therefore increase the final output; a subsidy to the final product will decrease 
the cost of final output production and therefore increase the final output; a 
subsidy to R&D will lower the cost of R&D and therefore raise the incentive 
of private R&D activities, which accelerate the technology development. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) conclude that both subsidies to the 
intermediate goods and to the final product can achieve the social optimum, 
while the subsidy to R&D can only achieve second best result, even though 
the long run economic growth can be improved. That is because the R&D 
subsidy cannot eliminate the distortion of the quantity of intermediate goods 
resulting from the monopoly power. The policy implications of above findings 
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are limited because non-distortionary taxes are not affordable to poor agents in 
practice. 
Zeng and Zhang (2007) extend the above model with distortionary taxes 
and elastic labor supply. They concluded that none of the subsidies can 
achieve the social optimum, because the externality of R&D has influence on 
the labor-leisure allocation. They also claim that the R&D subsidy is most 
effective from the growth perspective. Their results are consistent with our 
observation that R&D subsidies are commonly used in reality. We follow 
Zeng and Zhang (2007) to consider R&D subsidies. But we differ from their 
research in that we focus on the choice of optimal taxes to finance the 
subsidies.  
We use two stages maximization to solve the second best result. In 
chapter 4 we have already maximized the representative household’s welfare 
subject to its budget constraint (16), here we will maximize the household’s 
welfare subject to the government budget constraint (12). That is, the 
government chooses the optimal public policy variables ( ) to 
maximize welfare. The welfare is given by (28): 
  
According to the government budget constraint (12), the R&D subsidy 
can be expressed as a function of : 
  




Solving the problem yields the following first order conditions: 
: 
 
:   
 
: 
   
:   
The ( ) here should satisfy the constraints given by Eq. (29) and Eq. 
(30). The above first order conditions give the optimal policy variables 
( ). Because the closed-form results cannot be obtained in this case, 
we use numerical simulations. 
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We characterize a benchmark economy by setting: 
. The benchmark parameterizations 
are chosen to simulate the economy of the United State. Here measures the 
share of capital income to total income, which is around 1/3; is chosen to 
produce an annual growth rate around 3% (for the economy with taxes); is 
set equal to  (the annual discounting factor is 0.98 and one period 
represents 30 years); is chosen such that the household works around 10 
hours per day. We also normalize the initial technology variable  to one.  
We obtain the optimal taxes and subsidy rates and compare their growth 
and welfare effects. The results in Table 1 and Figure 4 to 6 show that (a) the 
R&D subsidy financed by consumption tax, labor income tax, and capital 
income tax increase the growth rate; (b) consumption tax is better than income 
tax from the welfare perspective.  
Table 1 Comparisons of different taxes  
Parameters:  
Cases 
       
welfare 
 only 0.29 0 0 0.7565 0.4541 5.77% 2.4332 -5.7561 
 only 0 0.26 0 0.7499 0.4385 5.73% 2.2806 -5.8082 
 only 0 0 0.15 0.3147 0.4202 4.27% 0.3983 -6.5955 
no tax 0 0 0 0 0.4110 4.53% 0.1485 -6.7409 





Figure 4 Consumption Tax vs. Welfare 
 




Figure 6 Capital Income Tax vs. Welfare 
We have analyzed in the previous chapters that the existence of monopoly 
in the intermediate goods sector result in a gap of the intermediate goods 
production between the decentralized economy and the social planner’s 
economy. This is reflected in Table 1 as a much lower growth rate (0.1485) 
and welfare level (-6.7409) compared to the social optimal growth rate 
(4.5742) and welfare level (-4.6036). We can also see that subsidizing R&D 
financed by the optimal level of consumption tax, labor income tax, and 
capital income tax increases the growth rate from 0.1485 to 2.4332, 2.2806, 
and 0.3983 respectively, and increases the welfare level from -6.7409 to -
5.7561, -5.8082, and -6.5955 respectively, although they are still below the 
optimal level. Comparing the effects of the three taxes, we find that the 
consumption tax distorts the welfare the least whereas the capital income tax 
distorts the welfare the most. This ranking is consistent with that in the 
existing literatures on taxation in capital-based endogenous growth models 
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[e.g., Devereux and Love (1994)] and neoclassical models [e.g., Chamley 
(1981) and Lucas (1990)].  
In order to test the robustness of the result, we vary the values of the 
parameters around the benchmark levels. Table 2, table3, table 4 and table 5 
show the sensitivity test of respectively.  
Table 2 Sensitivity test of  ( ) 
Parameters:  
Cases 
       
welfare 
 only 0.38 0 0 0.8128 0.4649 4.28% 2.7193 -4.9858 
 only 0 0.30 0 0.8034 0.4495 4.25% 2.5179 -5.0391 
 only 0 0 0.21 0.3957 0.4312 2.92% 0.3162 -6.1325 
no tax 0 0 0 0 0.4208 3.21% 0.0282 -6.3836 




       
welfare 
 only 0.29 0 0 0.7565 0.4541 5.77% 2.4332 -5.7561 
 only 0 0.26 0 0.7499 0.4385 5.73% 2.2806 -5.8082 
 only 0 0 0.15 0.3147 0.4202 4.27% 0.3983 -6.5955 
no tax 0 0 0 0 0.4110 4.53% 0.1485 -6.7409 




       
welfare 
 only 0.21 0 0 0.6860 0.4409 7.43% 2.1216 -6.5789 
 only 0 0.20 0 0.6660 0.4254  7.35% 1.9165 -6.6254 
 only 0 0 0.10 0.2423 0.4083 5.88% 0.4665 -7.1387 
no tax 0 0 0 0 0.4002 6.08% 0.2542 -7.2136 
social optimum / / / / 0.6032 21.82% 4.4814 -5.4277 
 
According to Eq. (6), there is a reverse correlation between the monopoly 
price of intermediate goods and , thus can be used to express the degree of 
the monopoly power in the intermediate goods sector. The smaller 
corresponds to the stronger monopoly power.  Without taxation and R&D 
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subsidy, stronger monopoly power leads to lower capital-output ratio and 
insufficient level of R&D input, which results in a lower growth rate of the 
economy, thus a higher subsidy is required to stimulate growth. Table 2 shows 
that a higher subsidy rate is always associated with stronger monopoly power. 
Table 3 Sensitivity test of  ( ) 
Parameters:  
Cases 
       
welfare 
 only 0.29 0 0 0.7606 0.4536 5.72% 2.2611 -5.8351 
 only 0 0.25 0 0.7368 0.4371 5.67% 1.9933 -5.8869 
 only 0 0 0.16 0.3482 0.4194 4.19% 0.3570 -6.6525 
no tax 0 0 0 0 0.4081 4.43% 0.0761 -6.8394 




       
welfare 
 only 0.29 0 0 0.7565 0.4541 5.77% 2.4332 -5.7561 
 only 0 0.26 0 0.7499 0.4385 5.73% 2.2806 -5.8082 
 only 0 0 0.15 0.3147 0.4202 4.27% 0.3983 -6.5955 
no tax 0 0 0 0 0.4110 4.53% 0.1485 -6.7409 




       
welfare 
 only 0.30 0 0 0.7582 0.4551 5.81% 2.6537 -5.6808 
 only 0 0.26 0 0.7464 0.4392 5.77% 2.4480 -5.7331 
 only 0 0 0.14 0.2834 0.4210 4.34% 0.4422 -6.5373 
no tax 0 0 0 0 0.4135 4.62% 0.2209 -6.6481 
social optimum / / / / 0.6161 19.09% 4.9225 -4.5326 
 
Table 3 shows that a higher R&D productivity parameter leads to a higher 
growth rate. 
Table 4 Sensitivity test of  ( ) 
Parameters:  
Cases 
       
welfare 
 only 0.21 0 0 0.7185 0.4473 5.36% 2.0026 -5.7823 
 only 0 0.20 0 0.7056 0.4339 5.32% 1.8448 -5.8170 
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 only 0 0 0.12 0.2987 0.4174 4.13% 0.3352 -6.3208 
no tax 0 0 0 0 0.4076 4.26% 0.0832 -6.4397 




       
welfare 
 only 0.29 0 0 0.7565 0.4541 5.77% 2.4332 -5.7561 
 only 0 0.26 0 0.7499 0.4385 5.73% 2.2806 -5.8082 
 only 0 0 0.15 0.3147 0.4202 4.27% 0.3983 -6.5955 
no tax 0 0 0 0 0.4110 4.53% 0.1485 -6.7409 




       
welfare 
 only 0.40 0 0 0.7925 0.4610 6.19% 2.9145 -5.6008 
 only 0 0.32 0 0.7847 0.4429 6.14% 2.7096 -5.6778 
 only 0 0 0.19 0.3412 0.4232 4.36% 0.4674 -6.8919 
no tax 0 0 0 0 0.4144 4.81% 0.2174 -7.0674 
social optimum / / / / 0.6373 20.30% 5.1236 -4.2666 
 
Table 4 shows that a higher discounting factor leads to a higher capital-
output ratio. The economic intuition is that the more patient is the 
representative household, the more capital he would likely to accumulate for 
the next period.     
Table 5 Sensitivity test of  ( ) 
Parameters:  
Cases 
       
welfare 
 only 0.3 0 0 0.7586 0.4813 5.81% 2.6298 -5.5316 
 only 0 0.26 0 0.7468 0.4653 5.77% 2.4298 -5.5812 
 only 0 0 0.14 0.2846 0.4468 4.33% 0.4378 -6.3809 
no tax 0 0 0 0 0.4391 4.61% 0.2162 -6.4925 




       
welfare 
 only 0.29 0 0 0.7565 0.4541 5.77% 2.4332 -5.7561 
 only 0 0.26 0 0.7499 0.4385 5.73% 2.2806 -5.8082 
 only 0 0 0.15 0.3147 0.4202 4.27% 0.3983 -6.5955 
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no tax 0 0 0 0 0.4110 4.53% 0.1485 -6.7409 




       
welfare 
 only 0.29 0 0 0.7597 0.4302 5.73% 2.2994 -5.9653 
 only 0 0.25 0 0.7446 0.4143 5.68% 2.0864 -6.0196 
 only 0 0 0.16 0.3445 0.3966 4.20% 0.3659 -6.7922 
no tax 0 0 0 0 0.3857 4.45% 0.0879 -6.9734 
social optimum / / / / 0.5908 19.09% 4.3798 -4.7984 
 
Table 5 shows that the more important is the leisure, the less labor supply 
will be provided. 
We notice that the welfare ranking of consumption tax, labor income tax, 
and capital income tax holds true in all the above cases, indicating the 
robustness of our result. 
To check whether the optimal mixes of all taxes can bring the social 
optimal or not numerically, we also simulate the situation with all taxes, which 
is shown in table 6. 
 Table 6 Optimal mixes of all taxes  
Parameters:  
Cases 




0.29 0 0 0.7565 0.4541 5.77% 2.4332 -5.7561 
social optimum / / / / 0.6146 19.09% 4.5742 -4.6036 
Note：Because the simulation of three dimensions (with all taxes) is more 
complicated than one dimension (with only , = =0), we lower the accuracy 
(otherwise the program of Matlab will run out of the computer’s memory), and get 
the max welfare= -5.7562 while =0.3, which is worse than the previous result in 
table 5. With higher accuracy, we should have get the max welfare=-5.7561 while 





Figure 7 Tax Mixes vs. Optimal Welfare 
Note: The right horizontal axis is the consumption tax, the left horizontal axis is the 
income tax, and the vertical axis is welfare. 
 
We also compute the figure under the assumption that the taxes on capital 
and income are the same. The graphs confirm that the optimal mix of 
(  ) is:  (0.29, 0, 0). 
Table 6 and Figure 7 show that (a) from the aspect of welfare,   is better 
than  and  , which is consistent with the conclusion that we get from table 1. 
Note that consumption taxes dominate capital and labor income taxes in our 
Cobb-Douglas world, but this result may not apply to a more general model. 
(b) optimal mixes of all taxes cannot bring with social optimum, which is 
consistent with the analysis in chapter 7.1. 
8 Conclusion  
This thesis examines the optimal public policy in an R&D-based endogenous 
growth model with elastic labor supply and monopolistic supply of 
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intermediate goods. In this model, the existence of monopoly power in the 
intermediate goods sector leads to lower levels of output in both the 
intermediate goods and final goods sector and the lower private rate of return 
on R&D investments results in a lower rate of long-run growth. Public policies 
are used to stimulate R&D activities. 
        We first compare the model economy’s decentralized equilibrium with its 
social optimal solution, and then analyze the growth and welfare effects of 
subsidies and taxes in the decentralized economy, finally investigate the 
optimal public policy. We use numerical simulations to obtain the optimal 
rates of subsidies and taxes and the welfare ranking of these taxes. 
We show that R&D subsidies financed by either consumption taxes, labor 
income taxes, or capital income taxes always increase the long-run growth rate 
and improve the level of welfare. We also show that, in terms of welfare, 
consumption taxes are better than labor income taxes which are in turn better 
than capital income taxes. These results are consistent with those in the 
existing literatures [e.g., Chamley (1981), Lucas (1990) and Devereux and 
Love (1994)]. Our findings complement the studies in the literature on optimal 
public policy in R&D-based endogenous growth models [e.g., Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1995) and Zeng and Zhang (2007)]. 
One limitation of this thesis is that we use a log utility function to simplify 
the analysis, and the analysis using a more general utility function awaits 
further research. However, we expect the main results in this thesis still hold 
true in a more general case. Another limitation is that we consider only R&D 
subsidies and the three taxes. Other policies such as patent protection and 
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Appendix 1. The shape and convexity of curve (30) in the first quadrant 





         
It is obvious that , and in the first 
quadrant , so that . Thus we get . We can claim that in the 
first quadrant, the first derivative of (30) is always negative, indicating the 
curve should be downwards sloping. 
Derive the second derivative of (30): 
  
        
where  
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Since  in the first quadrant, we 
get , thus the curve (30) is convex in shape.   
 
Appendix 2. Proof of the sufficiency of condition (31) for the unique 
steady-state growth equilibrium 






then the result of g will be given by  if  . 
It is easy to get , and under the condition (31), we can get , so 
that  and . If   , 
; if . 
Since negative growth rate has no economic meaning in our analysis, we give 
up  in both cases. Thus no matter  or  , the implicit 
function of g has and only has one positive solution. We concluded that 
condition (31) is sufficient to get the unique steady-state growth equilibrium. 
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Appendix 3. Proof of the effect of public policy on growth when they are 
taken exogenously 
In order to judge the effect of public policy on growth and labor input, we 
need to get the sign of the first derivatives of growth and labor input with 
respect to consumption tax, labor income tax, capital income tax and subsidy 
for R&A according to (29) and (30). 
 
Effect of consumption tax 
Taking the first order conditions of consumption tax on both sides of 
equation (29) and (30) yields: 
                                                                         (56) 
          (57) 
where 
  
Substituting (56) into (57) yields: 
          (58)    
Since  
we get according to (58). 
 
Effect of labor income tax 
Taking the first order conditions of labor income tax on both sides of 
equation (29) and (30) yields: 
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                                                                         (59) 
                   (60) 
Substituting (59) into (60) yields: 
                   (61) 
Since  we get 
according to (61). 
 
Effect of capital income tax 
Taking the first order conditions of capital income tax on both sides of 
equation (29) and (30) yields: 
                                                                                (62) 










Solving the system of linear equations (62) and (63) of two 
unknowns and , we can get . Since 
 we get . 
Effect of subsidy for R&D 
Taking the first order conditions of capital income tax on both sides of 
equation (29) and (30) yields: 
                                                                               (64) 





   
  
  
Solving the system of linear equations (64) and (65) of two 
unknowns and , we can get . Since 
 we get .  
 
Appendix 4. Compare the steady-state growth rate of the decentralized 
economy and the social planner’s economy 
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According to chapter 4 and 5, if we set , we get: 
  
  
Under the condition (31) 
that , we can get . 
  
                        
                        
                        
  
Thus we get . 











                              
where 
 
              
     
It is easy to get , 
thus in the first quadrant, . 
Since , 
we get .     
Thus we conclude  for every point 
of curves (29), (30), (51), (52) in the first quadrant.  
 
 
